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Hospital personnel have coined the term "granny dumping" to describe the
newly recognized phenomenon of abandoning the elderly in hospital emergency
rooms by frustrated families who, for various reasons, can no longer continue
to provide care.1 Having come into common use in late 1991,2 the term
"granny dumping" is currently being tracked by the editors of The American
Heritage Dictionary as a word that may eventually make its way into the
dictionary.3 Both the phenomenon and the term seem to be spreading and
gaining recognition by the press and the public.
One typical-yet-poignant reported case of granny dumping is that of a
woman found sitting in a wheelchair in the Tampa General Hospital Emergen-
cy Department.4 A note pinned to her said, "She's sick. Please take care of
her."' Dr. Toni Mitchell, director of the adult emergency department at
Tampa General calls cases such as this one "the positive tail-light sign. They
roll them in the door and all I see is the tail-lights vanishing in the distance." 6
Dr. Jack Allison, president of the American College of Emergency Physicians
and chief of services of the Pitt County Memorial Hospital Emergency Depart-
ment in Greenville, North Carolina, has also dealt with granny dumping.
Referring to it as the "packed-suitcase-syndrome," he explains that family
members "show up with all of granny's belongings in one or two suitcases and
they say, 'Put her in the hospital and take care of her.'" 7
In rural Newcastle, Wyoming, a family brought their aged mother in a
wheelchair to the office of Weston County Memorial Hospital and simply left
her there.' The family refused to pick her up, and they refused to cooperate
with social service agencies to investigate options for financial support. The
hospital, unable to place the woman in another facility, cared for her until her
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death nine months later. The unreimbursed costs of care caused the hospital
to show a loss. 9
For three months during the winter of 1989-1990, Evanston (Wyoming)
Regional Medical Center hosted an older, homeless individual who had been
one of the passengers on a Greyhound bus that skidded off Interstate 80 during
a blizzard.'0 All injured passengers received emergency care at the hospital,
and although most were discharged after a short time to resume their journeys,
the homeless patient lingered on, refusing to leave a warm bed and three meals
a day. The hospital attempted to transfer this patient to a facility offering a
lower level of care-more appropriate to the patient's needs-but no facility
would accept a non-funded patient."
In St. George, Utah, the Dixie Regional Medical Center frequently experi-
ences a patient census of 100% during the winter months due to the
community's growing popularity as a winter retirement retreat. 2 Despite the
hospital board's long-standing, well-publicized policy of reserving beds for
those in need of acute-level hospital care and refusing admission to those in
need of skilled nursing-level care, the hospital cared for an elderly patient with
a chronic terminal disease-admitted through the emergency department at the
family's insistence-for over two months in the winter of 1990. t" As these
examples illustrate, American hospitals often are expected to care for frail
elderly people who lack family or other support networks to assist with basic
living needs. Because the scope of their duty is so ill-defined, hospitals are
forced to retain elderly patients for unnecessarily long periods to the detriment
of the institution and other patients with serious medical needs.
This Article will examine briefly the scope of the growing social problem
of granny dumping. Next, it will trace the development of the hospital's
common law and statutory duties of care to elderly individuals, examining
legislative and judicial initiatives and focusing in particular on the extent or
end point of the duty of care. Then, the Article will suggest, as a short-term
action, a means to delimit the duty of care so that hospitals can avoid becoming
the "dumping ground," or social agency of last resort for the elderly who have
nowhere else to go. Finally, the Article will discuss possible means of amelio-
rating the problem of granny dumping through health-care delivery system
reforms relating to access to care and reimbursement for care.
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I. SCOPE OF THE GRANNY DUMPING PROBLEM
The scope of the granny dumping problem is not well documented; little
data has been collected to provide any objective measure of the phenomenon.
Until the fall of 1991, when a spate of press reports appeared using the term
"granny dumping," the problem of abandoned elderly in the hospital emergen-
cy department was not generally recognized as an issue distinct from the larger
problem of people seeking care in hospitals because they have nowhere else
to go. 4 While public and community hospitals traditionally have provided
charity care to indigent people in need of medical attention, the problem of
granny dumping presents a more complex set of issues. In a case of granny
dumping, the elder's needs usually extend beyond medical care to other basic
needs such as shelter and assistance with daily life activities. Granny dumping
creates a burden for hospitals not only by increasing the amount of economic
resources devoted to charity care, but also by extending the scope and com-
plexity of the abandoned patient's needs.
Some informal surveys suggest that the granny dumping problem is preva-
lent and growing throughout the United States. In response to its survey, the
American College of Emergency Physicians received responses from 169
emergency departments across the country, reporting an average of eight
abandonments a week."5 An extrapolation of this number leads to an estimate
of 70,000 granny dumping cases per year. A recent survey by the Senate
Aging Committee indicated that 38 % of the hospitals responding had received
reports of "elder abandonment."16
Granny dumping appears to occur more frequently in Florida, California,
and Texas, perhaps because of the large retirement communities in the sun
belt."' Nevertheless, incidents have been reported in Massachusetts 8 and
North Carolina 9 as well as in western states such as Wyoming20 and
Utah. 2' The American Association of Retired Persons reports that a small but
"rapidly growing number" of elderly are being abandoned at hospital emergen-
cy departments.22
From a societal perspective, granny dumping is symptomatic of over-
whelming familial stress. It is frequently a reaction to the burden placed on
14. See Melinda Beck & Jeanne Gordon, A Dumping Ground for Granny-Weary Families Drop Her
in the Emergency Room. NEWSWEEK, Dec. 23, 1991, at 64.
15. Elderly Abandoned, supra note 4, at 27.
16. Beck & Gordon, supra note 14, at 64.
17. Elderly Abandoned, supra note 4, at 27.
18. Phil Reaves, When Granny Becomes Too Much, JustDump Her; Families Are Leaving Their Cares
on Hospital Doorsteps, THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 5, 1992, at 18.
19. Elderly Abandoned, supra note 4, at 27.
20. Administrative Ethics, supra note 8, at 21.
21. See interviews cited supra notes 10, 12.
22. Rubin, supra note 1, atD4.
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adults who had children late and are caught between two dependent genera-
tions: the so-called "sandwich generation."' Increased granny dumping can
be attributed in part to a lack of resources for geriatric care, such as supervised
adult residential care, assisted living arrangements, home health care, or adult
day care.24 Because such health-care support resources rarely exist in the
sparse continuum of health-care options, people look to the hospital-the most
visible and historically most well-established institutional medical provider-for
help. 25 Pressured family care givers turn to the hospital emergency depart-
ment looking for a quick solution to relieve their burden and may, in despera-
tion, drop off granny.
More generally, granny dumping is symptomatic of a health-care system
in crisis. The American system has been described as "a paradox of excess
and deprivation."26 Although the United States spends a greater percentage
of its gross national product on health care than any other country-perhaps
as much as 15 % by the year 2000-more than thirty-five million Americans
have no financial protection from the expenses of medical care. 27 For those
without health-care insurance or for those with limited coverage, the emergen-
cy departments of both public and private hospitals become the only point of
access to care.28
Perhaps looking for a quick fix, Congress has attempted to legislate
solutions to the social problem of access to health care by mandating a duty
for hospitals to provide emergency care.29 But, due to ambiguities in the
patchwork of federal regulatory schemes affecting hospitals,30 it is the
author's contention that hospitals now have the burden of an open-ended duty
to provide care for all who seek it, regardless of ability to pay and regardless
of the patients' continuing need (or lack thereof) for acute-level hospital care.
Consequently, hospitals often are forced to wastefully appropriate their limited
resources or risk tremendous exposure to liability.
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 145-79
(1982) (providing a discussion of the history and development of hospitals from almshouses to "centers
of active medical treatment").
26. Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the 1990s, Universal
Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality and Economy, NEW ENG. J. MED., Jan. 5,
1989, at 29.
27. Id.
28. Peggy McNamara, NewAHA Survey: Emergency Departments in Gridlock, HOSPITALS, Feb. 20,
1992, at 38.
29. See Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9121, 100
Stat. 82, 164-67 (1986) [hereinafter COBRA] (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988)).
30. See, e.g., Phillip Green, Note, COBRA: Another New Patch on an Old Garment, 33 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 743 (1989) (focusing on the various federal programs that attempt to ensure access to care,
including the Hill-Burton Act, Medicare, Medicaid, and COBRA).
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II. THE HOSPITAL'S ILL-DEFINED DUTY OF CARE
A. Judicial Attempts to Increase Access: Development of a Common Law Duty
to Treat
Common law imposes no explicit duty upon physicians or hospitals to
rescue or treat those in need of emergency care.3 The "no-duty" rule arises
from tort theory which distinguishes between nonfeasance and malfeasance.32
Nonfeasance, or failure to provide care, normally will not trigger liability.
However, if there is an actual or implied consensual agreement creating a
physician/patient relationship, then once treatment has begun, and absent any
limiting agreement, the physician/hospital has a duty to continue treatment so
long as the case requires attention.33 The obligation of continuing attention
can be terminated in only three ways: by the cessation of the necessity that
gave rise to the relationship, by the discharge of the physician by the patient,
or by the withdrawal from the case by the physician after giving the patient
reasonable notice so as to enable the patient to secure other medical atten-
tion.34
Beginning in the 1960s, several state courts began to search for a basis on
which to impose a duty on hospitals to provide emergency treatment.35 Wil-
mington General Hospital v. Manlove, one of the first cases to impose such
a duty, grounded its holding on a reliance theory, opining that when a hospital
customarily renders emergency care service, and such undertaking is relied
upon by a person in need of emergency care, then the hospital has a duty to
provide such care.36 The Manlove decision by the Supreme Court of Dela-
ware has been described as "a turning point in the search for a common-law
duty to treat, representing the first time that a court went beyond the con-
straints of both the traditional tort misfeasance-nonfeasance theory and the
requirement of a hospital-patient relationship to find a new basis of liabili-
ty. ""' Nevertheless, courts did not widely adopt the Manlove reliance theory;
in fact, by 1989, fewer than twenty-five court decisions had cited the decision
and only a few had followed it.38 Difficulties in application and proof of the
elements of the Manlove theory-e.g., proof of "unmistakable emergency" and
"a well-established custom" to render care in such circumstances-may explain
31. Karen H. Rothenberg, Who Cares?: The Evolution of the Legal Duty to Provide Emergency Care,
26 Hous. L. REV. 21, 22 (1989).
32. Id.
33. See Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208 (Utah 1937); Childs v Weis, 440 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App.
1969).
34. Ricks, 64 P.2d at 211-12.
35. Rothenberg, supra note 31, at 23.
36. 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961).
37. Rothenberg, supra note 31, at 36.
38. Id. at 38.
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the limited following the case has received.3 9 Although one legal commentator
viewed Manlove as "a recognition of new public attitudes toward the issues
of health, hospitals, and emergency rooms," and possibly "the first step toward
the establishment of health care as a right, legally guaranteed to all Ameri-
cans," these great expectations have not been met as other state courts have
declined to follow Manlove.40
In 1975, after rejecting Manlove and in search of a different rationale, the
Supreme Court of Arizona held in Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hospital that
it was the "public policy of this state" that a "hospital may not deny emergen-
cy care to any patient without cause. "41 The Guerrero court found the public
policy in the Arizona health facility licensing laws, which required that hospi-
tals maintain emergency services for the benefit of the public without regard
to ability to pay.4" Since the duty to treat derived from a statute, the Guerrero
decision, like Manlove, had little direct impact outside the borders of the state
where it was decided.43 Whether based on a reliance theory or on licensing
statutes, a common law duty of care has not been recognized widely and has
met with only limited success in assuring access to emergency care.44
In recent years, twenty-one states have enacted statutes similar to that of
Arizona. The statutes impose some sort of access to emergency care or prohibit
inappropriate transfer of patients-commonly referred to as "dumping"-from
private to public hospitals.45 Most of these statutes, however, simply state
a prohibition against transfer and contain no enforcement provisions." Fur-
thermore, most of these state laws fail to include a private cause of action
allowing an injured individual to sue the hospital for failure to comply. 47 In
the absence of explicit statutory authority, courts are reluctant to create a
private cause of action. 4' Thus, while the beginnings of a duty to treat can
be found in limited case law and some state statutes, the duty to treat is not
widely or uniformly recognized.
39. Id. at 40.
40. Id. at 38; Barry Gold, Emergency Room Medical Treatment: Right or Privilege?, 36 ALu. L. REV.
526, 535 (1972).
41. 537 P.2d 1329, 1331.
42. Rothenberg, supra note 31, at 51.
43. Id. at 53.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317 (West 1990). Twenty-one states have passed
laws which attempt to regulate the problem of patient dumping by imposing some type of duty on hospitals.
See also James P. McHugh, Note, Emergency Medical Care for Indigents: All Hospitals Must Provide
Stabilizing Treatment or Pay the Price, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 165, 189 (1990). Eight of these statutes were
passed after COBRA was enacted in 1985.
46. McHugh, supra note 45, at 190.





B. Congressional Initiatives to Increase Access to Care: Development of a
Statutory Duty to Treat
Simultaneous with the limited development of case and state law to
establish a duty to provide emergency care, federal legislative initiatives to
increase accessibility to care took effect. Congress developed and passed
programs, beginning with the Hill-Burton Act in i94649 through the estab-
lishment of Medicare" and Medicaid" in 1965, that sought to assure avail-
ability of care to the elderly and the indigent. Unfortunately, weaknesses in
each statutory scheme have frustrated the goal of guaranteed access to care
and, simultaneously, have placed administrative burdens on health-care provid-
ers.
More recently, in 1986, Congress passed a new section to the Medicare
provisions entitled, "Examination and Treatment for Emergency Medical
Conditions and Women in Labor." Established by the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (effective August 1, 1986), the emergency
care requirements have become popularly known as "COBRA."52
Even the explicit duty to provide emergency care which COBRA imposes
on hospitals has shortcomings that inhibit realization of access to care. Among
other problems, COBRA has created ambiguities and an administrative compli-
ance burden for hospitals. The following sections will examine these statutory
initiatives and the subsequent failed attempts of the federal courts to establish
a workable legal duty for hospitals in hopes of increasing accessibility to care.
1. The Hill-Burton Program
The federal government first established a duty of care for hospitals in the
1946 Hospital Survey and Construction Act, popularly known as the Hill-
Burton Act. 3 Congress created this program in response to President
Truman's call for legislation that would ensure adequate health care for all
Americans.54 In return for federal assistance for the construction and modern-
ization of hospitals, the recipient facility assumed both the obligation of
49. Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946) [hereinafter Hill-
Burton Act] (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o (1988)).
50. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 102(a), 79 Stat. 286, 291-332
[hereinafter Medicare] (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ccc (1988)).
51. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §§ 121(a), 79 Stat. 286, 343-53
[hereinafter Medicaid] (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396s (1988)).
52. COBRA, supra note 29.
53. Hill-Burton Act, supra note 49.
54. President Truman's Message to Congress on Health Legislation, U. S. CODE CoNG. SERV. 1143
(1945).
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providing a reasonable volume of services to persons unable to pay and a
community service obligation.55
The subsequent Hill-Burton regulations (issued from 1947 to 1972) to
implement the statutory assurances of uncompensated care and community
service, merely tracked the statutory language and did not attempt to quantify
or elaborate upon the obligations.56 Finally, in 1974, as a result of lawsuits
seeking to enforce the Hill-Burton assurances, the Department of Health and
Human Services began to issue regulations that set standards for compliance
with the statute's goals.57
The 1979 regulations set specific charity care amounts, denied credit for
any Medicaid "shortfall,"" and prohibited exclusionary admissions poli-
cies.59 The last provision, relating to admissions policies, attempted to remedy
the problem of a lack of physicians with "admitting privileges" who would
accept Medicaid patients at a particular hospital. 60 The regulations suggest
various alternatives to hospitals, such as setting up a clinic or otherwise
directing patients to Medicaid provider physicians. 61 Nevertheless, the burden
of assuring access to care remains with the hospital, which can provide a bed,
furnishings, nursing care, and equipment, but cannot supply medical diagnosis,
medication, or treatment without a cooperative physician. The statutory scheme
unfortunately overlooked an essential element-the physician's involvement-in
its encouragement of uncompensated community service. To remedy the
oversight, hospitals are required to procure and pay for physician services, if
they are needed.
This lack of a physician obligation of care is but one of the weaknesses of
the Hill-Burton scheme. Commentators also have criticized Hill-Burton for its
failure to define "emergency" in setting forth a duty to provide emergency
care; its failure to require states to develop eligibility standards, hospital
guidelines, or complaint monitoring systems; its failure to prescribe punitive
measures for violations or to establish a private cause of action; and the
absence of any requirement to inform potentially eligible patients of free or
55. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1988).
56. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. Schweiker, 721 F 2d. 170 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
958 (1984) (reviewing the legislative intent and regulatory history of the Hill-Burton Act and holding that
the 1979 regulations, setting specific, quantifiable charity care compliance levels, were within the
Secretary's statutory authority to promulgate regulations).
57. See Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp. 61 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. La. 1972) (ordering an injunction
requiring the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to effect compliance with the
community service obligation and directing the Secretary to take action assuring that Hill-Burton hospitals
"terminate their practices and/or policies of excluding substantially all Medicaid beneficiaries").
58. 42 C.F.R. § 124.509(b) (1991). Hospitals are not allowed to credit against the uncompensated
care obligation the difference between the cost of care of a patient and the Medicaid reimbursement for
such care received by the hospital, which can be substantially less.
59. 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(d) (1991).
60. American Hosp. Ass'n, 721 F.2d at 181.




below-cost care.62 Although American Hospital Association v. Schweiker has
corrected some of the problems of Hill-Burton by affirming the regulations
mandating continuing obligation of community service-including the provision
of emergency services without regard to ability to pay (as opposed to the
twenty-year limit on the uncompensated care obligations)-so many faults
remain that the statute cannot be viewed as a successful health-care access
program.63
2. Medicare and Medicaid Programs
In 1965, after much public debate, Congress enacted Medicare as the
federal government's health insurance system for the elderly and disabled. 6
At the same time, Congress established Medicaid, to provide free government
health insurance for welfare recipients and certain other indigent groups, to
be funded by a combination of federal and state monies.65 As initially imple-
mented, Medicare and Medicaid did not impose a duty to provide emergency
treatment on hospital and physician providers within the programs. Rather, the
legislation aimed to ensure access to care to the elderly and indigent by
providing government funds to pay for such care.
Unfortunately, the Medicare and Medicaid programs have not fulfilled the
promise of assuring access to health care. Health-care costs skyrocketed during
the 1970s and 1980s, with expenditures increasing from 8% of the gross
national product to nearly 12%.66 Inflation, larger numbers of indigent, an
increasingly elderly population, and increased use of health-care services all
have contributed to the steep rise in costs. 67 In response, state Medicaid
programs have instituted cost-cutting measures that have reduced eligibility and
reimbursement levels. Medicaid covered 70% of the poor in 1965, but by
1984, it covered only 40%.68 Similarly, Medicaid programs have dropped
their reimbursement levels. In 1989, the national average Medicaid hospital
reimbursement was only 78 % of Medicaid costs. 69 As a result, many hospitals
have attempted to transfer Medicaid patients to other facilities to avoid the
financial shortfall.
62. See, e.g., Karen Treiger, Note, Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening the COBRA's Fangs,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1186, 1199-1200 (1986); Green, supra note 30.
63. See Treiger, supra note 62, at 1200; Helene Hoffman, Does COBRA Work? The Problem of
Patient Dumping and Possible Solutions, J. HEALTH & Hosp. L., Jan. 1992, at 3; Rothenberg, supra note
31, at 59.
64. Medicare, supra note 50.
65. Medicaid, supra note 51.
66. Treiger, supra note 62, at 1193 n.46.
67. Id. at 1192-93.
68. Id. at 1194.
69. Hoffman, supra note 63, at 11 n. 17.
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Changes in the Medicare reimbursement system also have created
incentives for hospitals to avoid treating indigent Medicare recipients. In 1983,
Medicare switched from cost-based reimbursement to a prospective payment
system.7" Medicare reimburses hospitals a fixed amount for specified illnesses
that are categorized by "diagnosis-related groups" (DRG's). Theoretically, an
efficient hospital can make money by holding the costs of a patient's care at
or below the DRG fixed payment levels. But those hospitals with higher costs
due to poor management or a high level of charity care may not be able to
cover their costs because of an inability to cost-shift or cross-subsidize indigent
care.
71
The net result of the changes, which have reduced eligibility and payment
in Medicare and Medicaid, has been to create economic pressures on hospitals
that mitigate against voluntary adherence to any implied duty to provide
emergency medical care without regard to ability to pay.
3. COBRA
a. COBRA's Statutory Provisions. In response to the continuing problem
of indigents' access to emergency care, Congress in 1986 enacted the emergen-
cy care provision of COBRA, which requires hospitals to provide medical
screenings and stabilization of all patients with emergency medical conditions
without regard to ability to pay.72 The emergency care provision was amend-
ed by OBRA in 1989 and 1990 in order to provide effective notice of availabil-
ity of care, to strengthen documentation requirements, to demonstrate compli-
ance, and to enhance enforcement.73
COBRA applies to any hospital that has a provider agreement with
Medicare, which includes almost all hospitals.7 4 It also imposes a duty on any
physician who provides on-call services at a hospital that is required to comply
with COBRA and who is in a position to examine, treat, or transfer patients
protected by the act.75
The scope of the duty imposed on the hospital and the physician extends
to any individual who comes to the hospital with a medical complaint.76 This
70. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 601, 97 Stat. 65, 149-63 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (1988)).
71. See Andrew J. McClurg, Your Money or Your Life: Interpreting the Federal Act Against Patient
Dumping, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 181 (1989); Treiger, supra note 62, at 1194.
72. COBRA, supra note 29.
73. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106; Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388.
74. COBRA, supra note 29. Ninety-eight percent of hospitals are participating providers for patients
enrolled in Medicare, according to BUREAU OF MANAGEMENT & STATISTICS, HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN.,
HCFA STATISTICS (1989).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(c) (1988).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1988).
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screening examination to determine the existence of an emergency medical
condition may not be delayed to determine the individual's insurance coverage,
method of payment, or financial status. 7
If an emergency medical condition exists, the hospital must either treat the
individual so as to stabilize the emergency condition or transfer the patient to
another facility or to home following specific requirements.78 The statute
defines "to stabilize" as the provision of necessary medical treatment to assure
that within reasonable medical probability the condition would not materially
deteriorate as a result of or during transfer.79 It is important to note that
"transfer" is defined as the movement or discharge of an individual outside
the hospital's facilities at the direction of any person employed by (or affiliated
or associated with) the hospital.80 This definition sweeps broadly to raise
issues of authority to transfer or discharge and the illusion of a guarantee of
medical condition post-discharge maintenance. In the landmark Burdit case,
a federal appeals court discussed the transfer provisions of the COBRA statute
and imposed a penalty on a doctor for the first time. The physician, who was
on-call to the emergency department by virtue of his obligation under hospital
medical staff bylaws, ordered the transfer of a patient contrary to a written,
COBRA-based hospital policy provided to him by a nurse." The Fifth Circuit
determined that the transfer was inappropriate, and in penalizing both the
physician and the hospital, held that because a hospital can act only vicariously
through individuals, any COBRA violation by a physician is also a violation
by a hospital.82 Further, since the definition of "transfer" extends to discharge
to the home, the hospital potentially could be liable if a physician discharged
a frail elderly person whose condition subsequently deteriorated due to lack
of support care at home.
Hospitals may transfer unstable patients in only two situations: either the
patient must request a transfer, or the physician must sign a certification which
states that she has determined that the medical benefits reasonably expected
at the receiving facility outweigh any increased risks to the patient from
transfer.8 3 In addition, the transfer must be an appropriate transfer, and a
transfer is appropriate only if a number of conditions are satisfied. First, the
emergency department must assure that it has provided, within its capacities,
sufficient medical care to reduce risks to the individual. Then, an agreement
to accept the transfer patient must be reached with the new facility. This new
facility must assure that it has available space and qualified personnel to treat
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(h) (1988).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (1988).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A) (1988).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(4) (1988).
81. Burditt v. Department of Health and Human Serv., 934 F.2d 1362, 1366-77 (5th Cir. 1991).
82. Id. at 1374.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(t) (1988).
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the individual to be transferred. The emergency department must then send all
available medical records relating the patient's emergency medical condition,
including a record of the identity of any physician who was on-call yet refused
or failed to appear within a reasonable time to provide stabilizing treatment
to the patient. The actual transfer must be accomplished with use of qualified
personnel and appropriate transportation equipment, including life support
equipment as medically necessary. Finally, other requirements for transfer may
be imposed in regulations by the Secretary of Health and Human Services."
These statutory requirements effectively extend the hospital's duty to
provide emergency treatment beyond the emergency department both to all
physicians who practice in hospitals and to the provision of all medical care
necessary to avoid deterioration of the patient's condition. The COBRA
amendments, effective July 1, 1990, impose liability on both the hospital and
any on-call physician who refuses or fails to appear within a reasonable period
of time. 5 The penalties do not apply to a physician who orders the transfer
of a patient because she determines that without the services of the on-call
physician the benefits of a transfer outweigh the risks of transfer. As discussed
in the Burditt case, this provision in effect exposes the hospital to potential
liability for the acts of both its agents and independently practicing medical
staff physicians through whom it carries out its duties, even if the hospital
itself does not knowingly violate the provisions of COBRA."
Subsequent COBRA amendments further broadened the scope of medical
treatment the hospital is obligated to provide.87 Now, all resources available,
including ancillary services routinely available-e.g. diagnostic testing, such
as electrocardiograms and diagnostic imaging, computerized tomography, or
magnetic resonance imaging-must be accessible and used, as medically
indicated, in the medical screening process. 8 In some cases, the hospital can
be obligated to perform a complete diagnostic workup which could extend over
a period of days.
Violations of COBRA subject a hospital to severe penalties. COBRA may
be enforced by suspension or termination of a hospital's Medicare Provider
Participation Agreement and the assessment of penalties by the Health Care
Finance Administration (HCFA). Additionally, civil actions can be brought
by other facilities that receive an improperly transferred patient or, under state
law, by individuals who suffer harm as a result of the hospital's violation of
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2) (1988). There are no other requirements imposed by the Secretary at
this time because no regulations have been issued.
85. 42 U.S.C. 1395dd(d)(1)(C) (1990).
86. James L. Hall, Jr., The New Medical Staff: Legal Issues Update, COBRAIOBRA PatientAntidu;p-
ing, Address Before the National Health Lawyers Association 15 (Sept. 27, 1991).
87. See COBRA, supra note 29.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1988).
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COBRA.89 Both the hospital and responsible physician may be charged a
$50,000 civil penalty for each knowing violation of the statue.9 As a result
of COBRA, the hospital has been saddled with a substantial, though poorly
defined, duty to treat nearly any patient who is left in its emergency depart-
ment, regardless of the patient's ability to pay or the appropriateness of
hospital care for the patient's particular health problem.
b. Significant Developments in COBRA Case Law. The growing body of
COBRA case law upholds the statutory extension of the duty of care beyond
the emergency department and arguably further extends the duty by interpreting
COBRA's provisions broadly. Emerging issues dealt with by the courts include
whether patients to whom hospitals deny treatment for non-economic reasons
may bring actions under COBRA and whether patients may bring private
actions against emergency department physicians who allegedly have violated
COBRA. Additionally, judges have examined these questions: does COBRA
preempt state medical malpractice laws relating to medical panel review and
damages limitations? Do COBRA's provisions apply beyond the emergency
department in their requirements for stabilizing treatment?
The federal courts have divided on the first issue: whether plaintiffs who
bring suit under COBRA must plead that care was denied to them on economic
grounds. COBRA states that "any individual" who suffers personal harm as
a direct result of the hospital's violation may obtain damages. Five federal
courts have followed the plain language of the statute and held that COBRA
applies to any individual denied treatment without regard to the person's
financial condition. 9 For example, in Cleland v. Bronson Healthcare Group,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a broad interpretation of COBRA,
consistent with the plain words of the statute extending coverage "to any
individual," is certainly not contrary to Congress' concern in passing the
legislation.92
In direct contrast, four federal courts have disallowed COBRA claims in
situations in which hospitals refused to treat plaintiff-patients based on non-
economic grounds.93 The cases all concerned disputes based on misdiagnosis
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2) (1988).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A)-(B). Effective May 1, 1991 the penalty was reduced to $25,000 per
violation for hospitals with less than 100 beds. These monetary penalties may be imposed by the Office
of the Inspector General, and they may be imposed in addition to suspension or termination of the hospital's
Medicare participation agreement.
91. Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990); Delaney v. Cade, 756 F.
Supp. 1476 (D. Kan. 1991); Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
Brooker v. Desert Hosp., 947 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1991); Wetzel v. Alleghany Regional Hosp. Corp., 778
F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Va. 1991).
92. Cleland, 917 F.2d at 270.
93. Nichols v. Estabrook, 741 F. Supp. 325 (D.N.H. 1989); Evitt v. Univ. Heights Hosp., 727 F.
Supp. 495 (S.D. Ind. 1989); Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433 (D. Kan. 1990); Zaikaner v. Danaher,
1990 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 38, 999 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 1991).
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or failure of the physician to recognize an emergency medical condition
followed by subsequent worsening of the condition and death. The courts held
in these cases that the plaintiffs had alternative avenues of recourse that were
more appropriate than a suit under COBRA, because the facts supported
bringing malpractice claims in state court. The development of contradictory
case law exacerbates the problem of defining the hospital's duty of care under
COBRA.
The federal courts have shown more agreement on the issue of whether
plaintiffs can bring private actions against physicians who allegedly have
violated COBRA. Most district court cases have decided to reject such
claims.94 Yet, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
has held that a patient does have a private cause of action against a physi-
cian.95
The question of COBRA's effect on state medical malpractice laws and
other preemption matters has been treated by the courts in a generally consis-
tent fashion as well. The COBRA statute provides that it does not preempt any
state or local law requirements unless direct conflict exists. 96 State medical
malpractice laws typically require a medical review panel to evaluate all
plaintiffs' medical malpractice claims as a prerequisite to filing suit and then
set limits for personal injury damages. Federal district courts in Indiana and
Louisiana have waived the medical review panel requirement in COBRA
actions.97 The state damage limitations have been upheld, however, by federal
district courts in Illinois and Indiana. 98
In 1990, statutory amendments extended the treatment necessary to
medically screen and stabilize the patient to include all routinely available
ancillary services. Case law then further extended the scope of required
treatment beyond the emergency department. In Thornton v. Southwest Detroit
Hospital, the circuit court refused to restrict application of COBRA solely to
the emergency room, noting that emergency care does not stop when a patient
is "wheeled from the emergency room into the main hospital. " '9 The Sixth
Circuit panel held that once a patient is diagnosed as having an emergency
medical condition in the emergency department, a hospital or physician cannot
discharge the patient until the condition is stabilized, regardless of whether the
94. Verhagen v. Olarte, No. 89-0300, 1990 WL 41730 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1989); Delaney v. Cade,
756 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Kan. 1991); Lavignette v. West Jefferson Medical Ctr., No. CIV.A.89-5495, 1990
WL 178708 (E.D. La. Nov. 7, 1990).
95. Sorrels v. Babcock, 733 F. Supp. 1189 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(O (1988).
97. Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical Hosp., 709 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Ind. 1989); Green v.
Touro Infirmary, No. CIV.A.90-4860, 1991 WL 17259 (E.D. La. Feb. 4, 1991).
98. See Reid, 709 F. Supp at 855; Maziarka v. St. Elizabeth Hosp., Medicare & Medicaid Guide
(CCH) 38,010 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
99. 895 F.2d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir. 1990).
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patient remains in the emergency department."° Although the court stated
that a hospital is not obligated to "bring patients to a complete recovery," it
did not provide guidance to hospitals beyond reference to the statutory defini-
tion of stabilization.10' The Loss v. Song'02 court followed Thornton and
held that Congress did not intend that the requirement to care for patients be
limited to the emergency department because emergency care of necessity often
goes beyond that department.
c. The Impact of an Ill-Defined Duty of Care. The Thornton case attempts
to grapple with the key question of when hospitals may legally cease treatment
under COBRA. COBRA requires that a patient be stabilized so that "within
reasonable medical probability," the patient's condition will not "materially
deteriorate."103 This definition, however, has been criticized as being highly
subjective and too susceptible to reinterpretation when examining physicians'
decisions with the benefit of hindsight."04 As a result, after five years of
experience with COBRA, hospitals and physicians remain unclear as to the
scope of their duty under the statute. As noted above, federal courts are
divided as to whether or not COBRA covers patients when hospitals refuse to
treat for non-economic reasons.1 5 Further, COBRA assumes that hospitals
control physicians, which simply is not always the case."° While the 1990
amendments extended the scope of COBRA to on-call physicians, many
medical staffs are either unaware of this fact or resistant to it. 107
Finally, by imposing a duty on hospitals to provide care without establish-
ing a funding mechanism to pay for such care, COBRA arguably has exacer-
bated the access problem it was designed to solve.'o8 In practice and applica-
tion, it has not created a network of legally obligated emergency care providers
for the elderly and indigent. Instead, as the burden of providing this unre-
imbursed care has increased, so has the number of hospitals that have chosen
to reduce services, close their emergency departments, or close their doors
altogether. '09
Nor does COBRA mitigate economic realities that lead private hospitals
to "dump" unstable, indigent patients on to public facilities; rather it heightens
100. Id. at 1134.
101. Id.
102. No. 89C-6952, 1990 WL 159612 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 1990).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A) (1988).
104. Green, supra note 30, at 775.
105. See cases cited supra notes 91-93.
106. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 63, at 7; Rothenberg, supra note 31, at n.334; Burditt v. Sullivan,
934 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1991).
107. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 63, at 7; Jur Strobos, Patient Transfer Update: Part 11, FORE-
SIGHT, Jan. 1992, at 2.
108. See Hoffman, supra note 63, at 7; Green, supra note 30, at 780-83.
109. Id.
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them. Uncompensated care and shortfalls in reimbursement from Medicare and
Medicaid create tremendous economic pressures for hospitals.' 10 One study
estimates that to achieve 2 % operating profit margin the average hospital, with
40% of its revenues coming from Medicare and Medicaid, must earn eight
cents on the dollar treating privately insured patients to compensate for losing
seven cents on the dollar treating Medicare and Medicaid patients."' As for
cost-shifting, the American Hospital Association estimates that in 1989 hospi-
tals charged an additional two billion dollars to private payers to cover Medi-
care losses alone." 2 More recently, the chairman-elect of the American
Hospital Association presented testimony to the United States Senate Finance
Committee indicating that in fiscal year 1993, 900 hospitals will lose up to
10% treating Medicare beneficiaries, another 900 hospitals will lose between
10% and 20%, and 2,000 hospitals will lose more than 20% of costs of care
provided to Medicare beneficiaries that Medicare will not reimburse." 3 In
sum, COBRA has had a chilling effect on hospitals because it imposes a duty
to provide care, enforced by severe penalties, without specifying either the
financial means to comply or the scope and extent of the duty." 4
IV. WHEN HAS THE HOSPITAL FULFILLED ITS DUTY OF CARE?
With COBRA's ambiguous scope and definition-particularly the definition
of "stabilize"-hospitals face great difficulty in determining with any consisten-
cy or precision when they have fulfilled their duty of care. Questions of this
nature existed prior to COBRA, but the potential liabilities under the COBRA
provisions have served to magnify the problem and forced hospitals to address
this urgent question more intently than before.
Thus far, only two COBRA cases have focused on the end point of the
hospital's duty of care." 5 The case of Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hospi-
tal, discussed briefly above, purports to set an upper limit on how far treat-
ment must be extended." 6 An elderly woman who suffered a stroke gained
admission to the hospital through the emergency department and received
eleven days of in-patient care. At that point, the hospital attempted to transfer
her to a rehabilitation facility, but the facility refused to accept her because
110. David Burda & Cathy Tokarski, Hospitals Are Under Pressure to Justify Cost Shifting, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, Nov. 12, 1990, at 28.
111. Id. at 32.
112. Id. at 28.
113. News at Deadline, HOSPITALS, Mar. 5, 1992, at 10.
114. Green, supra note 30, at 780.
115. See Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1990); Loss v. Song, No.
89C-6952, 1990 WL 159612 (N.D. III. Oct. 16, 1990).




she was unable to pay for services. The hospital subsequently discharged her
to her home where she received home health services. The women brought suit
after her condition deteriorated at home. The plaintiff alleged that the hospital
had violated COBRA because it failed to assure that, according to the COBRA
definition of "stabilize," reasonable medical probability existed that her
condition would not materially deteriorate as a result of the transfer." 7 The
court took a more restrictive view than other courts and held that the hospital
had met COBRA requirements because Congress intended the statute to
guarantee only emergency treatment to indigent patients, not long-term
care. 8 The court held that it was not necessary for the hospital to "bring
patients to a complete recovery."119
While the Thornton case indicates that long-term, rehabilitative care is
beyond the scope of the hospital's duty, many questions remain. The line is
not easily drawn between emergency care and continuing medical treatment
after the patient has received care in the emergency department. Many patients
can be treated to alleviate crises in emergency departments, but the nature of
their medical conditions may be such that repeated or continuing intervention
may be required. This is not long-term care, but care for chronic conditions.
Suppose, for example, an elderly patient with a gall bladder attack can be
treated in the emergency department, his pain alleviated and his general
condition evaluated. The medical diagnosis, however, indicates surgery to
remove the gall bladder. A problem arises if the hospital transfers the patient
to his home and recommends that he arrange to have surgery to remove the
gall bladder, but the patient cannot do so because he lacks health insurance.
When the patient suffers another gall bladder attack a few days later, is the
hospital liable for failing to fulfill its duty of care?.2
Another hypothetical example involves an elderly patient experiencing
congestive heart failure who arrives at the emergency department. She is
examined and administered medication to ease her breathing, but her family
worries that her breathing difficulties will recur. She is transferred home with
oxygen. She returns to the emergency department forty-eight hours later in
florid congestive heart failure, suffers cardiac arrest, cannot be resuscitated,
and dies. Has the hospital failed to meet its duty?'2 '
It is ambiguous situations such as these that led the American College of
Emergency Physicians to urge that physicians document in detail all factors
comprising their current medical judgment as to why there is no reasonable
medical probability of material deterioration either from or during the patient's
117. Id. at 1132.
118. Id. at 1134
119. Id.
120. Telephone Interview with Thomas Weed, M.D., President, Utah Chapter of the American College
of Emergency Physicians (Jan. 25, 1992).
121. Id.
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transfer, particularly if the patient is going home." Even with such docu-
mentation, according to the American College of Emergency Physicians, the
decision to transfer or discharge a patient against that patient's will for eco-
nomic reasons "is fraught with risk of financial liability, public outcry, patient
dissatisfaction, and allegations of improper care." "
Having considered the extent of the hospital's duty of care under COBRA
and within COBRA's economic terms, we still must answer two related and
perhaps more compelling questions: At what point does the duty of care end
where ability to pay is not an issue? And what if the hospital wants to discon-
tinue treatment for non-economic reasons? Only three cases provide any guid-
ance at this point: one predates COBRA and two are post-COBRA, although
they do not contain COBRA claims. 2 4
The first case, Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School v. Geohegan,
involved the quite common case of the hospital patient who no longer needs
hospital care and who can be provided for adequately in a nursing home.'21
After a series of negotiations with defendants, the plaintiff-private hospital
brought a trespass action to require Ellen Geohegan's removal from the
hospital.'26 In finding for the hospital, the court held that hospitals have a
duty not to permit their facilities to be diverted to uses for which hospitals are
not intended and that "it would be a deviation from its purposes to act as a
nursing home for aged persons who do not need constant medical care but ...
[only] nursing care. "127
Other courts have declined to follow the holding of the 1967 Webb case
and it is questionable whether the D.C. District Court itself would decide that
case in the same manner today. Hospitals now approach such cases with
extreme caution and insist on laborious documentation in view of the risks of
COBRA litigation, economic sanctions, and bad publicity."'
Payton v. Weaver, a California case involving an "obnoxious" dialysis
patient, is the only post-COBRA case that deals directly with the issue of the
end point of the physician's and hospital's duty of care.'29 Since Medicare
covers end stage renal disease treatment,3 lack of insurance or inability to
pay played no role in the case. Instead, the Payton decision was controlled by
122. Strobos, supra note 107, at 6.
123. Id. at 5.
124. Lucy Webb Hayes Training Sch. v. Geohegan, 281 F. Supp. 116 (D.D.C. 1967); Payton v.
Weaver, 182 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1982); In re Wanglie, Minn. Dist. Ct., No. PX-283, Jan. 28, 1991 (as
reported in Court Refuses to Appoint Conservator to Make Life-Suppor Decisions for Woman in Coma,
MENTAL HEALTH L. NEWS, May 1992, at 5.
125. Geohegan, 281 F. Supp. at 117.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 120-23.
129. 182 Cal Rptr. 225 (1982).




relevant provisions of the California mandatory emergency services law. '
The court analyzed the case using traditional abandonment criteria and deter-
mined that Dr. Weaver had given Ms. Payton due notice and ample opportuni-
ty to secure other medical treatment.'32 The court held that although "end
stage renal disease is an extremely serious and dangerous disease, which can
create imminent danger of loss of life if not properly treated, the need for
continuous treatment" is not a condition qualifying for mandatory emergency
services pursuant to the California statute.'33 The court reasoned that:
There are any number of diseases or conditions that could be fatal to a patient if
not treated on a continuing basis. If a patient suffering from such a disease or
condition were to appear in the emergency room of the hospital in need of
immediate life saving treatment, Section 1317 would presumably require that such
treatment be provided. But it is unlikely that the legislature intended to impose
upon whatever health care facility such a patient chooses the unqualified obligation
to provide continuing preventive care for the patient's lifetime."3
The court struggled, however, with the concept of the hospital as the holder
of a scarce medical resource needed to preserve life and it suggested that the
hospital should not be permitted to withhold its services arbitrarily or without
reasonable cause. 3 5 The court speculated that a collective responsibility on
the part of providers of scarce health resources, enforceable through equity,
may exist to share the burden of difficult patients. 136 In the final analysis,
the court found an alternative to assure that Ms. Payton did not die from lack
of treatment as a result of her disruptive behavior: voluntary mental health
conservatorship in a private psychiatric facility. 1
37
The Payton case instructs us on one issue: it sets a limit on the duty of care
at "immediate lifesaving treatment" for cases of chronic medical conditions
that require continuing treatment. Yet it also leaves us with an ambiguous
result. The court refused to extend a duty of continuing care to a particular
physician or hospital, but demonstrated its reluctance to hold that no duty
existed to provide care through its discussion of "collective responsibility. "'
Thus, Payton provides little meaningful guidance to hospitals attempting to
conform their emergency department policies to the COBRA provisions.
The hospital's duty of emergency care is truly pushed to its furthest
application with the following question: does a duty of continuing care in order
to maintain life exist? The third case dealing with the end point of the hospit-
al's duty of care grapples with this crucial issue. It presents the reverse of the
131. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317 (West 1990).
132. Payton, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
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more typical "right to die" case in which families seek to withhold treatment
from a critically ill patient, and instead asks if the hospital can withhold the
life-preserving treatment without the permission of the patient's family.' 39
During the summer of 1991, Hennepin County Medical Center drew
national attention when the hospital initiated legal action to determine whether
it had a duty to continue to provide care to Helga Wanglie, an eighty-six-year-
old woman in a persistent vegetative state whom the hospital kept alive by use
of a ventilator.1 40 Hospital physicians determined that continued use of the
ventilator was medically inappropriate. Private insurance fully reimbursed the
cost of care-over $800,000 to care for Mrs. Wanglie from May 1990 until
her death July 4, 1991. The issue focused on whether the family could require
the hospital and its physicians to continue "futile" treatment.'
In December 1990, the hospital asked the family to find another facility
capable of caring for Mrs. Wanglie, but the family refused. 142 Finally, the
hospital petitioned the probate court to appoint an independent conservator to
make medical decisions for Mrs. Wanglie. The court denied the petition
because the hospital offered no evidence that Oliver Wanglie, the patient's
eighty-seven-year-old husband, was incompetent to discharge the duties as
conservator for his wife. 143 The hospital medical director said the decision
frustrated him because it forced his hospital to continue to provide care to Mrs.
Wanglie that the medical staff believed to be inappropriate.'"
Dr. Arthur Caplan, Director of the Center for Biomedical Ethics at the
University of Minnesota, said he believed that the Wanglie case would trigger
a similar case where the question regarding treatment limits would be an-
swered. But he claimed that the matter would be better handled in legislatures
than in courtrooms. 145 In the same vein, Susan M. Wolf, an ethicist at New
York's Hastings Center, commented that the case identified the need for
society to decide what limits can be placed on treatment.14
In summary, the cases analyzed in this section attempt to answer the
question, retrospectively, of when has the hospital fulfilled its duty of care.
Two cases, Thornton and Geohegan, suggest that the hospital's duty of care
does not extend to rehabilitative or long-term nursing care. 47 The Payton
139. See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
140. Can Families Require Doctors to Continue Futile Treatment?, AMA NEws, July 22, 1991, at
32 [hereinafter Futile Treatment].
141. Id.
142. Tom Majeski, Board Faces Life and Death Decision, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Dec. 13, 1990,
at Al.
143. Tom Majeski, Judge Refuses to Let Hospital Unplug Patient, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, July
2, 1991, at Al [hereinafter Judge Refuses].
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Futile Treatment, supra note 140, at 32.
147. Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1990); Lucy Webb Hayes Training
Sch. v. Geohegan 281 F. Supp 116 (D.D.C. 1967).
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case held that the hospital's duty of care does not extend to chronic medical
conditions unless the patient has an acute episode and requires immediate, life-
saving treatment.'48 Finally, although there was no court ruling on the issue,
the hospital caring for Mrs. Wanglie argued that its duty should not extend to
the provision of "futile" care.'49 These cases shed some light on the issue
of when the hospital has fulfilled its duty of care, but hospitals still remain
largely in the dark.
V. SHORT-TERM ACTION: A MEANS TO DELIMIT THE
HOSPITAL'S DUTY OF CARE
While case law provides some assistance to hospitals in defining their duty
of care and developing useful emergency room policy to deal with increasing
granny dumping, hospitals need a means to delimit the duty of care more
clearly and explicitly so that physicians and administrators confidently can
make their medical evaluations within the parameters of the law. Hospitals
need to be able to clearly formulate and communicate their policies on the
extent or end point of care to their staff and to their communities. They also
need coherent policies to avoid potential liability, pursuant to COBRA," 0
state emergency care statutes,' 5 ' and other common law causes of action. 52
In the short term, Congress should amend the COBRA statutory provisions
to clarify the definition of stabilization. Several commentators recommend the
adoption of the American College of Emergency Physicians' description of
stabilization, which includes medical criteria relating to the establishment of
an adequate airway, adequate ventilation, adequate fluid and/or blood replace-
ment, and adequate vital signs.'53 This definition conforms to common medi-
cal usage of the term "stabilize," which refers to an improvement or leveling
of vital signs. ' It sets forth objective, measurable medical criteria in con-
trast to the conclusionary, hindsight element of the current COBRA definition
148. Payton v. Weaver, 182 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1982).
149. Judge Refuses, supra note 143, at Al.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988).
151. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317 (West 1990). Twenty-one states have passed
laws which attempt to regulate the problem of patient dumping by imposing some type of duty on hospitals;
see also McHugh, supra note 45, at 189.
152. See, e.g., Wanglie Legal Bills Paid, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESs, Dec. 19, 1991, at C3. A claim
of approximately $40,000 for costs of litigation incurred by Mr. Wanglie was presented to the Hennepin
County Commissioners.
153. See Guidelines for Transfer of Patients. ANNALs EMERGENCY MED., Dec. 1985, at 1221;
Strobos, supra note 107. The definition includes "establishing and assuring an adequate airway and adequate
ventilation; initiating adequate fluid and/or blood replacement; and determining that the patient's vital signs
are sufficient to sustain adequate perfusion."
154. Jur Strobos, Tightening the Screw: Statutory and Legal Supervision of Interhospital Patient
Transfers, ANNALS EMERGENCY MED.. Mar. 1991, at 302, 304.
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which requires an advance determination that the patient likely will not deterio-
rate as a result of transfer.' 5
To introduce a helpful time element to the definition of stabilization, one
commentator has suggested that a definition of "stable for transfer" (or dis-
charge) include a determination that the next step in anticipated care would not
be scheduled for several hours and that any transfer/discharge would not lead
to a delay or break in medical care.1 6 These clarifications and additions to
the definition of stabilization would delimit more clearly the extent of care the
hospital is obligated to provide to elderly patients with chronic medical condi-
tions or to patients in need of long-term or rehabilitative care. A definition of
stabilization based on time-limited, medical criteria could help hospitals to
answer-in many more cases-the question of when they have fulfilled their
duty of care.
VI. LONG-TERM ACTION: NATIONAL HEALTH-CARE REFORM
Admittedly, enactment of a new definition of "stabilized" would not be a
panacea. Even with a new definition of stabilization, hospitals would continue
to experience granny dumping. The phenomenon of granny dumping in over-
crowded hospital emergency departments is a symptom of the larger crisis in
American health care.5 7 It demonstrates compellingly the problem of lack
of access to care. Although a review of national health-care reform develop-
ments is beyond the scope of this Article, the following discussion briefly sets
forth two relevant criteria by which to measure or analyze national health-care
reform proposals as to their impact on access to care and, in turn, their impact
on granny dumping balanced against a fair and defined duty of care for
hospitals.
Any health-care reform proposal first must put forth a plan for access to
a continuum of health-care services, including acute, sub-acute, and primary
care. Hospitals cannot and should not be the only providers of care. In the past
decade, an "explosion" in emergency department visits has created a crisis due
to overcrowding and limited resources." 8 A survey published in the Annals
of Emergency Medicine suggested that, particularly for the poor, the emergency
department has become the primary point of access to the health-care sys-
tem.' 59 Due to COBRA requirements the emergency department must treat
155. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c) (1988).
156. Strobos, supra note 154, at 309.
157. See, e.g., Study Cites Emergency Room Crisis, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 27, 1991, at 15; Emily
Friedman, The Sagging Safety Net: Emergency Departments on the Brink of Crisis, HOsPrrAis, Feb. 20,
1992, at 26.
158. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 157, at 26.




all patients without regard to ability to pay. 6" It is not surprising then that
people view the hospital emergency department as "a safety net, a lifeline for
the community" in terms of access to care.'61
Overly stressed families utilize this "safety net" when they dump granny.
The problem is that granny needs a range of services, not just acute hospital
care. But government initiatives to assure access to health care, e.g., the Hill-
Burton program, Medicare, and COBRA, wrongly have focused attention
exclusively on hospitals.
The Medicare program in many respects functions as national health-care
insurance for the aged. But, it offers very little coverage for long-term care.
Medicare will reimburse the beneficiary for only 100 days in a skilled nursing
facility subject to a daily co-insurance payment equal to one-eighth of the
applicable inpatient hospital deductible for days 21-100. 62 Even this level
of coverage is restricted by the requirement of a related, immediately preced-
ing hospitalization as well as level of care requirements mandating that services
must be "skilled" and result in the improvement of the patient's condition
rather than "custodial" services.' 63 As a result of such restrictive coverage,
Medicare occupies a very small niche in long-term care, accounting for less
than 3% of total nursing home expenditures.'" If an individual does not
qualify for Medicare-reimbursed long-term care or exceeds the Medicare
length-of-stay limit, then payment must be out of pocket. If the individual lacks
private means of payment, then she must "spend-down" to qualify for Medic-
aid. Since Medicaid functions as a welfare program with a strict means test,
the "spend-down" results in "virtual impoverishment" for most elderly. 65
One report claims that due to "spend-down" the average elder today spends
more personal money (both in absolute dollars and as a percentage of income)
on total health care than she did prior to the enactment of Medicare and
Medicaid in 1965.166
The American Geriatrics Society has published its view that "although there
are gaps in acute care coverage under Medicare, it is the absence of coverage
for long-term care that is the genuine catastrophe" for the elderly and their
families. 67 The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 attempted to
expand long-term care benefits and alleviate the potentially devastating finan-
cial burden of unexpected and prolonged medical-care needs,168 but Congress
160. See supra text accompanying notes 74-80.
161. Friedman, supra note 157, at 30.
162. 42 C.F.R. § 409.85 (1991).
163. Id.; 42 C.F.R. § 409.31 (1991).
164. Marshall B. Kapp, Options for Long-Term Care Financing: A Look to the Future, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 719, 723 (1991).
165. Id. at 724-25.
166. Id. at 726.
167. Id. at 719.
168. See Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 Stat. 683.
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repealed the law only sixteen months later, largely due to negative public
reaction spurred by the imposition of higher "premiums" on the more well-off
Social Security recipients in order to cover the poorer elderly and to support
financially the expanded coverage.1
69
An effective national health-care scheme must allow entry into the delivery
system at intermediate levels of care. Once patients have gained entry, they
should receive comprehensive services at each level of care in the health-care
continuum. For example, after the need for skilled nursing care in a long-term
care facility has been met, then patients should have access to care either in
a residential care setting or in an adult day care setting. One commentator has
alleged that a major weakness of public policy has been its failure to address
adequately the financing of non-institutional alternatives to long-term care
(e.g., adult day care, life care communities, respite care, congregate living
arrangements, and hospice). 170 If such a range of services were accessible
to the indigent elderly, then granny dumping at hospital emergency departments
would be rare or non-existent.
The second criterion for health-care reform proposals relates to cost. Only
adequate funding will assure universal and uniform eligibility for services. At
the heart of the debate on health-care reform lies the question of whether or
not national government should assume responsibility for the provision of
health care to its citizens. Although there is widespread sympathy for the
elderly poor as deserving of society's help, there appear to be growing tensions
as the working class views itself as sacrificing to pay taxes to support federal
entitlement programs like Medicare which all elderly may tap into irrespective
of need.' 7 ' The challenge of financing comprehensive health-care services
for the elderly will be how to spread costs in an "equitable, efficient, and
politically acceptable way. "172
To date, the United States has taken an incremental approach to the provi-
sion of health care covering specified needs for targeted populations through
Medicare and Medicaid. Any national health-care plan that perpetuates the
inequalities in the types of services covered and the levels of reimbursement
provided for various population groups will in turn encourage "dumping" of
underfunded patients from private to public institutions. The economic pres-
sures that promote cost-shifting on to private payers cannot be solved unless
universal coverage with reasonable reimbursement levels applies throughout
the health-care delivery system.
169. See Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Repeal Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-234, 103 Stat. 1979;
see also Lawrence A. Frolik & Alison P. Barnes, An Aging Population: A Challenge to the Law, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 683, 710 (1991) (discussing some of the factors that contributed to the Congressional
repeal).
170. Kapp, supra note 164, at 727-28.
171. Frolik & Barnes, supra note 169, at 713.




In the long term, far more than clarification of the hospital's duty of care
will be required to put an end to granny dumping. A solution to this problem
necessarily involves addressing the wider issues of access to care and setting
limits of care. The Wanglie case provides the scenario for linking the issues
of duty of care, access to care, and limits to care with life or death conse-
quences. The ultimate resolution of these complex issues must await difficult
legislative and societal determinations of fundamental values within ethical and
economic restraints.
VII. A CALL FOR SOLUTIONS
Reviewing the development of the hospital's legal duty to provide care
establishes a context for understanding the current state of the law. COBRA
now provides an affirmative duty to provide, at a minimum, and without
regard to ability to pay, a medical screening examination to every individual
who enters the hospital emergency department seeking care. Nevertheless, due
to problems in the definitions, scope, and applications of COBRA, hospitals
now stand in the unenviable position of assuming a duty without a clear end
point. Having established the hospital/patient relationship, a hospital has a duty
of treatment that could potentially continue as long as the patient or family
demands care. Therefore, in the short term, the COBRA definition of stable
to transfer or discharge should be changed to include objective, time-limited,
medical criteria that would minimize potential liability to hospitals. Then
hospitals would be relieved of the legal jeopardy posed by granny dumping and
left only with the practical social problem of finding appropriate placement.
In the long term, we must address the fundamental. issues of how much
health-care assistance we owe to the elderly and how much we can afford.
Meaningful policy choices about access to care and reimbursement for care
will be a function of the political process. An effective solution must be
fashioned as part of a comprehensive national health policy that incorporates
a goal of funding some level of universal care. Until we achieve that goal
however, hospitals must act cautiously to set their own limits given medical,
ethical, and economic constraints.
While the short-term action of clarifying the hospital's duty of care will
help institutional health-care providers cope with abandoned elderly patients,
granny dumping will continue to plague our nation until there is broad-based
national health-care reform. Only when every American has a right to compre-
hensive, uniformly reimbursed health-care services will granny dumping cease
to be a grave problem for overburdened hospitals and an overburdened society.
